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INMATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS  
AND THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT 
ANN WOOLHANDLER* & MICHAEL COLLINS** 
ABSTRACT 
Scholars have criticized requirements that inmates prove malice or 
deliberate indifference to establish constitutional claims against 
corrections officials. The Eighth Amendment currently requires convicted 
prisoners to show that a prison official acted “maliciously or sadistically” 
to establish an excessive force claim and with subjective “deliberate 
indifference” to establish a claim of unconstitutional prison conditions. 
Similar requirements can apply with respect to claims by pretrial detainees, 
whose claims are governed by substantive due process rather than the 
Eighth Amendment. 
Scienter critics have argued for use of an objective reasonableness 
standard for all inmate claims—both those brought by convicted prisoners 
and pretrial detainees. This Essay argues that the scienter requirements are 
more justified than critics claim. Critics argue that the Court has based its 
state-of-mind requirements on a mistaken notion that, for an action to 
constitute punishment, it must necessarily involve a purpose to chastise or 
deter. Intentions to chastise and deter, however, remain central to the 
concept of punishment, and reference to other purposes of punishment does 
not suggest dispensing with a culpable state-of-mind requirement in inmate 
suits against corrections officials. Scienter requirements, moreover, may be 
justified apart from notions of punishment, by the need to maintain order in 
prisons and to distinguish constitutional violations from ordinary torts. 
Finally, state-of-mind requirements do not pose the impenetrable barrier to 
liability that critics claim. This is particularly true in systemic conditions 
cases—the cases that have the most promise for improving the lives of 
inmates.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have criticized requirements that inmates prove malice or 
deliberate indifference to establish certain kinds of constitutional claims 
against corrections officials. 1  The Eighth Amendment is currently 
understood to require convicted prisoners to show that a prison official acted 
“maliciously or sadistically” to establish an excessive force claim and with 
subjective “deliberate indifference” to make out a claim of unconstitutional 
prison conditions. Similar requirements can apply with respect to pretrial 
detainees, whose claims—because the detainees are not yet convicted—are 
governed by substantive due process rather than the Eighth Amendment.2  
 
1. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 357, 360–61 (2018); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth 
Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 895–97 (2009); Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of 
Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1380–84 (2008). There are others who question 
scienter requirements, see, e.g., infra notes 6–7, but this Essay focuses on arguments by Professors 
Schlanger, Dolovich, and Ristroph.  
2. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (“Where the State seeks to impose 
punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72 n.40 
(1977))). Substantive due process claims are brought under the Fifth Amendment by federal detainees 
and under the Fourteenth Amendment by state and local detainees. The term “inmate suits,” as used 
herein, refers to both the claims of convicted prisoners and of pretrial detainees and encompasses claims 
regarding general conditions, specific conditions, and excessive force. The Essay does not address First 












The Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson3 heightened 
the criticism of scienter4 requirements for inmate suits. In Kingsley, the 
Court held that a pretrial detainee claiming that corrections officials used 
excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause need only show that the force was objectively unreasonable.5 The 
plaintiff was not required to make the further showing of malice that would 
have been required under the Eighth Amendment for excessive force claims 
by convicted prisoners. In the wake of Kingsley, Professor Margo Schlanger 
and others have argued for use of an objective reasonableness standard for 
all inmate claims, including those brought by convicted prisoners under the 
Eighth Amendment.6 These proposals echoed pre-Kingsley calls by scholars 
such as Professors Sharon Dolovich and Alice Ristroph for minimizing or 
eliminating scienter requirements in inmate suits in favor of negligence or 
strict liability standards.7  
These critics not only agree that the Court should move toward using 
only objective standards, but they are also largely in accord as to reasons 
for doing so. They claim that the state-of-mind requirements for both Eighth 
Amendment and substantive due process claims8 originate from a mistaken 
belief that an intent to punish must be established to invoke the Eighth 
 
3. 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). 
4. Scienter refers to a state of mind either of purpose or knowledge with respect to wrongdoing. 
The deliberate indifference standard used in inmate cases requires knowledge about the risks of certain 
harms. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994). This article uses the term “deliberate 
indifference” to refer to a subjective standard requiring knowledge. 
5. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2475–76. 
6. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 360–61; Rosalie Berger Levinson, Kingsley Breathes New Life 
into Substantive Due Process as a Check on Abuse of Government Power, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 357, 
358–59 (2017) (favoring an objective reasonableness standard); cf. Alexander A. Reinert, 
Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 
94 N.C. L. REV. 817, 824, 840, 859 (2016) (providing some historical evidence of a malice requirement 
in cases involving prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishments of enslaved persons, but arguing 
against a malice standard in the current Eighth Amendment context as not reflecting current standards 
of decency); John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 458, 463–64 
(2017) (arguing that an intent to be cruel should not be required for Eighth Amendment violations); 
Meredith D. McPhail, Ensuring that Punishment Does, in Fact, Fit the Crime, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
213, 220, 227–28 (2018) (arguing Kingsley indicates that prisoners’ claims should be considered under 
more lenient substantive due process standards). 
7. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 1, at 881–82, 971 (recommending alternative standards of 
heightened negligence or modified strict liability); Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1397–99, 1404 (arguing 
that punitive intent is not a necessary condition of punishment); Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of 
Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1060–61 (2013) (arguing for an objective deliberate 
indifference standard for most pretrial detainee claims); Paulo Barrozo, Reconstructing Constitutional 
Punishment, 6 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 175, 231–32 (2014) (arguing for greater attention to the suffering 
component of cruelty). 
8. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 385–86 (whether “‘punishment’ definitionally requires the 
subjectively culpable intent of a punisher” is relevant to both Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment cases). 











Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 9  And they 
argue that the intent requirements mistakenly treat what are essentially 
systemic harms as individual wrongs by corrections officials. 10  They 
assume, moreover, that the scienter requirements impose a significant 
roadblock to successful inmate claims and thus to meaningful improvement 
in the treatment of prisoners.11  
This Essay evaluates the arguments against scienter requirements in 
inmate constitutional litigation. It concludes that state-of-mind 
requirements are more justified than critics claim.  
I. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AND EXCESSIVE 
FORCE: AN OVERVIEW 
The kinds of inmate claims that this Essay addresses—both with respect 
to convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees—are claims of unconstitutional 
conditions of confinement and claims of excessive force.12 As noted above, 
these are treated as Eighth Amendment claims when brought by convicted 
prisoners, whether in state or federal custody. The Eighth Amendment is 
inapplicable to pretrial detainees, however, because they are not convicted 
prisoners subject to punishment.13 Substantive due process is therefore the 
source of rights for pretrial detainee claims regarding conditions of 
confinement and excessive force. 
Conditions claims. Conditions claims can be subdivided into two main 
groups: claims that raise more systemic issues, such as overcrowding, and 
claims that allege more episodic harms, such as those involving the failure 
of corrections officials to protect an inmate from third-party violence or the 
 
9. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 1, at 359–61 (claiming the Court’s unsupported definition of 
punishment is the foundation for its subjective standards under the Eighth Amendment); id. at 386–88 
(arguing that intention should not be definitional to punishment); Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1395–97 
(citing various aims of punishment, such as incapacitation, as undermining any requirement that an intent 
to chastise or deter be central to an Eighth Amendment claim). 
10. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 1, at 905 (arguing that current approaches do not “appreciate 
the state’s responsibility for all official conduct that impacts prisoners”); id. at 937–38 (cases against 
individual officers should address “institutional cruelty, arising from the character of the institutional 
arrangements the state has created”); Schlanger, supra note 1, at 420–21 (arguing that subjective 
standards allow easily preventable harm to escape liability, given the fragmented knowledge and 
responsibility that follow from ordinary bureaucratic design). 
11. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 360 (claiming the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment 
“has radically undermined prison officials’ accountability for tragedies behind bars”); Ristroph, supra 
note 1, at 1382–83 (assuming judges almost always resolve state-of-mind issues in inmate cases and that 
their findings generally favor defendants).  
12. Both types of claims are “prison conditions” claims under the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000), 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3624, 3626 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A, 1932 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997a–1997h (2000)). 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). 












failure to attend to serious medical needs of an individual prisoner.14 All 
Eighth Amendment conditions claims—i.e., those that involve convicted 
prisoners—contain an objective component as well as a subjective 
component. In general prison conditions cases, convicted prisoners must 
show that the challenged conditions objectively failed to meet basic human 
needs 15  and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to such 
harms.16 Claims of failure to address serious medical needs require both the 
objective showing of a serious medical need and deliberate indifference to 
the serious need.17 Similarly, a claim based on failure to protect a prisoner 
from third-party violence—e.g., violence by a fellow prisoner—requires 
showing an objectively substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner and 
deliberate indifference of the official.18  Deliberate indifference in these 
inmate cases is subjective deliberate indifference—that is, it requires actual 
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.19 
With respect to conditions, the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth 
and Fifth Amendments provide protections for state and federal detainees 
that are similar to those that the Eighth Amendment provides for convicted 
prisoners. Most courts use a subjective deliberate indifference standard for 
pretrial detainee particularized conditions cases, as they do in all Eighth 
Amendment prison conditions claims.20 There is, however, some division 
and lack of clarity among the federal appellate courts as to whether a 
 
14. Professor Schlanger provides a chart of various standards. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 364. 
Her chart appears to assume that the requirement of deliberate indifference is inapplicable to any 
conditions claims by pretrial detainees. But cf. Struve, supra note 7, at 1023–30 (indicating that courts 
have generally used a deliberate indifference standard for pretrial detainee episodic conditions claims 
and that many require a finding of deliberate indifference for general conditions claims). Professor 
Schlanger’s assumption is based on Bell, a pretrial detainee case. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 377 
(concluding that Bell is best read as announcing and utilizing an objective approach). According to the 
Court in Bell, determining whether restrictions are punishment could involve an inquiry into “whether 
an alternative purpose . . . rationally . . . is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation 
to the alternative purpose assigned.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)). The Court used this language primarily to evaluate policies restricting the 
receipt of books from certain sources and policies regarding body and room searches. Id. at 560–62. The 
Court, with little discussion, concluded that the practices were reasonable responses to security concerns 
and did not involve punishment. Id. 
15. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346–47 (1981). 
16. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (requiring a showing of deliberate indifference in 
a general conditions case). In Wilson, “[t]he complaint alleged overcrowding, excessive noise, 
insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and 
inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and 
physically ill inmates.” Id. at 296. 
17. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 
18. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
19. See id. at 837–38 (third-party violence); Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106 (medical care). 
20. Struve, supra note 7, at 1023, 1026–30 (showing that lower courts have generally used the 
deliberate indifference standards for individualized conditions claims). 











subjective deliberate indifference or an objective unreasonableness standard 
applies for general conditions claims of pretrial detainees.21 
Excessive force. Convicted prisoners’ Eighth Amendment excessive 
force claims also contain an objective and subjective component. They 
require an objective showing of unreasonable force and a subjective element 
that looks to “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain 
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 
causing harm.”22 For pretrial detainees claiming the use of excessive force 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Court in Kingsley v. 
Hendrickson applied an objective reasonableness test rather than the malice 
test required for convicted prisoners.23 
In summary, convicted prisoners under Eighth Amendment standards 
must show subjective deliberate indifference in both general and specific 
conditions claims. And they must show malice in excessive force claims. 
Pretrial detainees under Due Process standards usually need to show 
subjective deliberate indifference as to specific conditions claims, and many 
circuits require such a showing for general conditions claims. Pretrial 
detainees need only show objective unreasonableness in excessive force 
claims. 
II. PURPOSE AND PUNISHMENT 
Many scholars object to scienter requirements (such as malice or 
subjective deliberate indifference) in prisoner or pretrial detainee claims 
regarding conditions and excessive force. Professor Schlanger, for example, 
applauded Kingsley’s use of an objective reasonableness test for pretrial 
detainees’ excessive force claims and recommended the use of such a 
reasonableness test across the board for all inmate claims of excessive force 
and conditions—whether general or particular, and whether brought by 
convicted prisoners or pretrial detainees. 24  Professor Dolovich has 
suggested a “modified” strict liability or negligence standard for convicted 
 
21. Id. at 1023, 1025–26 (noting some equivocation and division among the circuits regarding 
use of the Eighth Amendment standard or the somewhat more lenient standard of Bell). 
22. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 
1033 (2d. Cir. 1973)); accord Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). 
23. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475–76 (2015); cf. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 
408 (stating that many lower courts pre-Kingsley required a showing of both excessiveness and a 
culpable state of mind). 
24. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 360–61. Writing prior to Kingsley, Professor Struve 
recommended an across-the-board objective deliberate indifference standard for pretrial detainee claims. 
Her standard would require a showing that the defendant officer knew or should have known of a 
substantial risk of serious harm which he/she failed to address—effectively prescribing a form of 
negligence by allowing liability based on what the defendant officer should have known. Struve, supra 
note 7, at 1061, 1068. Professor Levinson subsequently argued for similar standards in light of Kingsley. 












prisoners’ claims,25 while Professor Ristroph has generally questioned the 
Court’s focus on an intent to chastise or deter as critical to Eighth 
Amendment standards.26  
These critics argue that the Court derives the scienter requirement from 
its mistaken conclusion that the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibition requires an intent to punish. To assess their 
arguments, it is first necessary to determine what role punishment plays in 
both Eighth Amendment and analogous substantive due process doctrine.  
A. The Role of a No-Punishment Norm in Eighth Amendment and 
Substantive Due Process Cases 
The Eighth Amendment historically addressed legislatively and 
judicially imposed sentences.27 These practices clearly involved an intent to 
chastise or deter, and constitutional issues often focused on whether the 
intended punishment was cruel and unusual.28 As the Eighth Amendment 
expanded into other areas, Judge Henry Friendly’s influential opinion in 
Johnson v. Glick29 suggested that a showing of deliberate imposition of 
punishment was required to hold corrections officials liable for Eighth 
Amendment violations: 
 Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted suggests action taken, 
usually by a court, in carrying out a legislative authorization or 
command. . . . The background of our own Bill of Rights, however, 
makes clear that the Eighth Amendment was intended to apply not 
 
25. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 936. Although her standard seems addressed to Eighth 
Amendment conditions claims, particular and general, she sometimes appears to consider excessive 
force claims. See, e.g., id. at 905–06 (considering Hudson, an excessive force case, to show that state 
agents’ “treatment of prisoners in the course of administering state-imposed prison terms constitutes the 
penalty the state has imposed”). Professor Dolovich also seems to see pretrial detainee claims as more 
or less encompassed by her discussion, on the assumption that courts tend to accord detainees the same 
rights as convicted prisoners. Id. at 886 n.15. 
26. Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1395–97 (“It is simply not true that only acts intended to chastise 
or deter are commonly recognized as punishment.”); cf. Reinert, supra note 6, at 824, 859 (providing 
some historical evidence of a malice requirement but disfavoring a malice requirement for contemporary 
Eighth Amendment claims); Stinneford, supra note 6, at 458, 463–64 (arguing against a requirement 
that cruelty be intentional).  
27. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of 
Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 54, 61–68 
(2009) (providing a history of Eighth Amendment case law).  
28. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 441–42, 447–49 (1890) (upholding a statutory 
provision for electrocution); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (finding the harsh 
penalties provided by Philippine law under which the defendant was sentenced to be cruel and unusual). 
29. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). Glick involved a pretrial detainee claim of excessive force, but 
Judge Friendly discussed convicted prisoners as well. Substantive due process—not the Eighth 
Amendment—was generally the source of the prohibition against excessive force for convicted prisoners 
as well as pretrial detainees at that time. See id. at 1032–33. 











only to the acts of judges but as a restraint on legislative action as 
well. . . . Indeed, every decision of the Supreme Court striking down 
a punishment under the Eighth Amendment has concerned a 
legislative act.  
 We do not suggest, however, that the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause must necessarily be read as limited to acts of 
legislatures in authorizing sentences or of judges imposing them. It 
can fairly be deemed to be applicable to the manner in which an 
otherwise constitutional sentence, as the death penalty was then 
thought to be, is carried out by an executioner, or to cover conditions 
of confinement which may make intolerable an otherwise 
constitutional term of imprisonment. On a parity of reasoning, we 
find no difficulty in considering the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause to be applicable to such systems of prison discipline as solitary 
confinement or corporal punishment. The thread common to all these 
cases is that “punishment” has been deliberately administered for a 
penal or disciplinary purpose, with the apparent authorization of high 
prison officials charged by the state with responsibility for care, 
control, and discipline of prisoners. In contrast, although a 
spontaneous attack by a guard is “cruel” and, we hope, “unusual,” it 
does not fit any ordinary concept of “punishment.”30 
Since Friendly wrote in 1973, Eighth Amendment claims have further 
expanded, and now include not only general conditions claims (to which 
Friendly alluded), but also episodic harms such as specific conditions claims 
(e.g., third-party violence and medical needs claims) and excessive force 
claims. For the most part, these inmate Eight Amendment claims do not 
involve infliction of harm as part of the legislatively and judicially 
prescribed sentences, nor even as part of prescribed penalties for 
disciplinary infractions.31  
In this expanded Eighth Amendment universe, the Court has required 
scienter as a rough substitute for the intent to punish that inherently 
accompanies legislatively and judicially imposed sentences. If a corrections 
official is deliberately indifferent or malicious in causing certain harms, his 
reprobated intent is treated as a kind of intent to punish (beyond the legally 
imposed penalties). In effect, a no-punishment norm is reflected in the 
scienter requirements for prison conditions and excessive force cases. 
Characterizing the cases as prescribing a no-punishment norm may seem 
odd, because convicted prisoners can obviously be subjected to the intended 
 
30. Id. at 1031–32 (citations omitted). 
31. But cf. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (considering the sanctioned use of a hitching 












punishment of incarceration. And imprisonment may properly entail some 
discomfort, including less-than-ideal living conditions, as part of the 
lawfully prescribed punishment.32 But to establish an Eighth Amendment 
violation as outlined in Part I, a prisoner needs to show both an objective 
harm that crosses some threshold beyond the ordinary attributes of prison 
life, together with a subjective element. When both of those elements are 
present, the harm becomes illicit punishment.  
For example, a general conditions case could not be established by 
showing routine discomforts associated with incarceration; the objective 
component of a constitutional violation would be missing, even if an intent 
to impose such discomforts may be present. By contrast, failure to meet 
basic human needs due to prison officials’ deliberate indifference crosses 
into illicit punishment—meeting both an objective standard (failure to meet 
basic human needs rather than ordinary discomforts that attend prison life)33 
plus a subjective standard (deliberate indifference).34  And in specific 
conditions cases involving a particular prisoner’s medical care, officials’ 
failure to provide top flight medical care will not meet an objective standard, 
but serious medical needs to which officers are deliberately indifferent will 
cross into an Eighth Amendment violation. 35  While some prisoner-on-
prisoner jostling and injuries may follow from not holding prisoners in 
isolation,36  substantial risks of serious injury to which officers are 
deliberately indifferent will make out a specific conditions case.37 Similarly, 
while some use of physical force by guards is necessary to maintain order 
and discipline, objectively unreasonable force that is maliciously inflicted 
on a convicted prisoner to cause pain is treated as illicit punishment.38  
Although the language of “punishment” is not found in the Due Process 
Clauses, a no-punishment notion is nevertheless relevant to pretrial 
detainees’ substantive due process claims. In Bell v. Wolfish,39  pretrial 
detainees challenged several general conditions, including double bunking 
and limitations on the receipt of books. 40  To ground protections for 
detainees in the constitutional text, then-Justice Rehnquist reasoned that 
 
32. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–49 (1981) (“To the extent that such conditions are 
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses 
against society.”). 
33. Id. at 347. 
34. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1991). 
35. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976).  
36. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (considering the involuntary 
confinement of persons with mental disabilities) (“And an institution cannot protect its residents from 
all danger of violence if it is to permit them any freedom of movement.”). 
37. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994). 
38. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). 
39. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
40. Id. at 520, 527. 











pretrial detainees are not yet subject to official state punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment, and therefore it would violate due process if state 
officials did subject them to punishment.41 Thus, the no-punishment notion 
will often play a role in pretrial detainee cases similar to the no-punishment 
notion in convicted prisoner cases.42  
One might suppose that it would be easier to meet the Fourteenth 
Amendment no-punishment standard than the Eighth Amendment no-
punishment standard,43 given that the Eighth Amendment proscribes only 
cruel and unusual punishment whereas substantive due process under Bell 
proscribes punishment altogether. Alternatively, one might assume that it 
would be easier to make out a claim under a specific Bill of Rights 
provision, such as the Eighth Amendment, than under the vaguer standards 
of substantive due process.44 But in both contexts the Court uses similar no-
punishment norms, and the standards have tended to be the same (Kingsley 
and some courts’ approaches to general conditions cases excepted). For 
example, in neither the pretrial detention nor the postconviction context are 
state officials liable for all prisoner-on-prisoner altercations; it is only when 
officials are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm that 
illicit state punishment has occurred. In both contexts, the state may provide 
less-than-ideal medical care, but at some point officials cross a line into 
illicit punishment—where the medical needs are objectively serious and 
officials are deliberately indifferent to them. And as to general conditions 
cases, the Court has indicated that both convicted prisoners and pretrial 
detainees can be subjected to some discomfort without violating either the 
Eighth Amendment or substantive due process, but deliberate indifference 
to basic human needs violates both.45  
Although the Court has prescribed a no-punishment norm for claims not 
involving attacks on legislatively or judicially prescribed sentences, and 
views the no-punishment norm as requiring scienter, this does not mean that 
the Court in fact requires a specific intention to chastise or deter to meet the 
 
41. Id. at 535 n.16 (“Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, 
the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72 n.40 (1977))).  
42. See supra note 9. 
43. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982) (“Persons who have been 
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than 
criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” (citation omitted)); cf. Schlanger, 
supra note 1, at 432–33 (arguing against allowing harsher standards for convicted prisoners and noting 
that “jails tend to be harsher, more idle, and more dangerous than prisons”). 
44. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (noting the Court’s 
“reluctan[ce] to expand the concept of substantive due process”); id. at 846 (only egregious conduct by 
executive officers should be deemed violative of substantive due process). 
45. Bell, 441 U.S. at 534 (some discomfort experienced by a pretrial detainee does not rise to 
deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest). As noted above, some courts see the standard for general 












scienter requirement. As Justice O’Connor stated when using the Eighth 
Amendment to address a claim of excessive force in Whitley v. Albers46 and 
in prescribing a malice standard: “To be cruel and unusual punishment, 
conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more 
than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.”47 Justice 
Scalia analogously stated in Wilson v. Seiter,48 “If the pain inflicted is not 
formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, 
some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can 
qualify.”49 To the extent the Court uses a no-punishment concept to define 
a more extended range of harms than those directed by legislatively and 
judicially imposed sentences, the Court sensibly has required an official’s 
culpable state of mind––even if a specific intention to punish is not 
required.50 
B. Punishment and Other Purposes 
The background no-punishment principle in the Eighth Amendment and 
the Due Process Clauses has somewhat benefitted inmates by treating 
certain injuries that occur during incarceration as constitutional violations if 
the action or inaction that caused them was accompanied by scienter. But 
critics would make the standards even more helpful to inmates by 
eliminating the scienter element altogether.51 They particularly fault Justice 
Scalia’s opinion in Wilson v. Seiter,52 in which a convicted prisoner sought 
injunctive relief for general prison conditions such as insufficient heating 
and cooling. 53  In requiring a showing of prison officials’ deliberate 
indifference to make out an Eighth Amendment claim––even in a general 
conditions case––Scalia stated: 
The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this 
Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and 
 
46. 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 
47. Id. at 319. 
48. 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991). 
49. Id. at 300. 
50. Both Professors Schlanger and Dolovich argue that if an intent to punish is required to 
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, then deliberate indifference standards are inconsistent 
with the Eighth Amendment. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 386; Dolovich, supra note 1, at 895–96. But if 
the Supreme Court—as it purports to do—is translating an Eighth Amendment standard to situations not 
involving a focused intent to punish, some culpable state-of-mind requirement may be appropriate. As 
discussed below, moreover, proof of scienter is often required for substantive due process claims. See 
infra text accompanying notes 82–91. 
51. See supra note 7.  
52. See Schlanger, supra note 1, at 378 (stating that Gamble and Albers “gestured towards a 
textual hook” that would later become central to Scalia’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with 
Wilson). 
53. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 296.  











unusual punishment. . . . As Judge Posner has observed: “The 
infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or 
deter. This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the 
eighteenth century . . . .”54 
The scienter critics do not claim that a purpose to punish, in the sense of 
intent to chastise or deter, is necessarily irrelevant in determining whether 
an inmate is suffering impermissible punishment. They do claim, however, 
that such purposes are not the only purposes behind punishment, and they 
apparently view such alternative purposes as dissipating a scienter 
requirement.  
As Professor Schlanger has stated, “The point is that chastisement and 
deterrence are far from the only purposes of punishment, and that intent to 
punish is important but not definitional in identifying what punishment is.”55 
She points out, for example, that “[c]riminal restitution . . . is intended to 
make victims whole. In the era of self-supporting or profit-making prisons, 
sentences of hard labor were intended to promote profitable use of prison 
labor.”56 These cited purposes, however, are generally consistent with, and 
overlap with, intentions to chastise or deter. Imposing restitution as part of 
a criminal sentence comports with intentions to chastise and deter, even if 
it serves the additional purpose of compensating a victim. Imposing hard 
labor is part of a sentence intended to chastise and deter, even if profit may 
also have been a motive. It is not clear why possible additional purposes for 
punishment displace reliance on intentions to chastise and deter to support 
state-of-mind requirements in inmate suits.  
Alternative purposes to chastisement and deterrence, moreover, may still 
constitute purposes that support scienter requirements. For example, 
Professor Ristroph points out that some framers saw the Eighth Amendment 
as encompassing a prohibition on torture with a purpose to obtain 
information.57 The torturer, however, surely has a culpable state of mind: an 
intent to inflict pain that is not legally justified. And it is a culpable state of 
 
54. Id. at 300 (citation omitted); cf. Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing 
Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1815, 1859 (2012) (arguing the text of the Eighth Amendment requires subjective intent). 
55. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 388; see also id. at 361 (considering this “undersupported and 
idiosyncratic definition of the concept of ‘punishment’” to be the “foundation for a subjective liability 
standard”). 
56. Id. at 386–87; see also Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1396 (“There is little doubt that what we 
call punishment is sometimes aimed at incapacitation, sometimes at reform or rehabilitation, and in still 
other instances at restoration of wealth or other goods to the victim, at demonstrating the punisher’s 
political power, or at the satisfaction of popular sentiment.”). 
57. Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1396. She recognizes, however, that such claims are generally not 












mind, not a focused intent to chastise or deter, that the Court requires in 
inmate cases.58  
C. Effects as Punishment? 
The scienter critics apparently see their undermining of purposes to 
chastise and deter as supporting the idea that harsh effects should be enough 
to qualify as punishment.59 Focusing on effects means that the objective 
component of inmate claims would be the central element in determining 
liability, and scienter requirements could be eliminated in favor of 
negligence or strict liability standards. 
Both Professors Schlanger and Ristroph rely on Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez60 to support their claims that effects should suffice.61 The Court in 
Mendoza-Martinez held unconstitutional a statute that allowed 
administrative imposition of the loss of citizenship on citizens who departed 
the United States to avoid military service. The Court held that the loss of 
citizenship was penal, and thus its administrative imposition inflicted 
punishment “without affording the procedural safeguard guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments” for criminal trials.62 As to whether such a 
disadvantage should be considered “penal or regulatory in character,”63 the 
Court stated:  
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation 
will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and 
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a 
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the 
inquiry, and may often point in differing directions. Absent 
conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of 
a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on 
 
58. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
59. See Dolovich, supra note 1, at 905–06 (arguing that the intent to imprison is enough to infer 
an intent to punish, so harms that occur during confinement should be actionable if they are cruel, 
without reference to state of mind); see also Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1358, 1391–94 (discussing 
scholarship that argues intent is in all events morally irrelevant); Barrozo, supra note 7, at 231–32 
(explaining a “victim-subjective” conception of cruelty). 
60. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
61. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
62. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 165–66. 
63. Id. at 168. 











its face.64  
Professor Schlanger points out that “promot[ing] the traditional aims of 
punishment—retribution and deterrence” is only one of many factors, and 
that other factors are “explicitly about effects, not intent.” 65  Professor 
Ristroph argues that “[t]he doctrine allows, in theory, for a statute’s effects 
to take precedence over its intent.”66  
The Mendoza-Martinez factors, however, seem overall directed to 
ascertaining a legislative intention to punish. 67  The most effects-based 
language in the Court’s opinion is “whether an alternative purpose to which 
it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” But even this 
inquiry appears to be directed toward discerning underlying punitive 
legislative intent. 68  What is more, the case law on characterizing 
purportedly noncriminal statutes has adhered closely to intent to punish 
requirements, as Professor Ristroph herself points out.69 
III. THE PROPRIETY OF A SCIENTER REQUIREMENT FOR INMATE SUITS 
EVEN APART FROM PUNISHMENT 
The scienter critics believe that by arguing that an intent to chastise or 
deter is not necessary for an act to constitute punishment, they have cleared 
the way for standards they believe more appropriate for inmate suits.70 
Malice and subjective deliberate indifference requirements would be 
reduced to negligence or even strict liability. But even putting aside the 
premise that punishment requires scienter, the context of incarceration 
suggests the propriety of scienter requirements. Indeed, the malice standard 
for excessive force claims largely developed by reference to prison 
management rather than by reference to “punishment.” 
In Johnson v. Glick, discussed above, Judge Friendly articulated the 
malice standard in a pretrial detainee excessive force case under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, famously stating: “The management by a few 
guards of large numbers of prisoners, not usually the most gentle or tractable 
of men and women, may require and justify the occasional use of a degree 
 
64. Id. at 168–69. 
65. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 387–88.  
66. Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1372. 
67. For example: “whether the behavior to which [a sanction] applies is already a crime.” 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. See also Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1373 (noting courts have 
generally looked for a legislative punitive intent, but that establishing such intent can be difficult). 
68. Cf. Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1372 (stating that Mendoza-Martinez may allow for 
determination of legislative intent “by a more complex analysis of multiple factors”). 
69. See id. at 1372–73 & nn.82–83. 












of intentional force.”71 Justice O’Connor resorted to the Glick standards for 
convicted prisoner excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment in 
Whitley v. Albers,72 a case involving force used to suppress a prison riot. 
While adverting to punishment as suggesting that more than negligence 
should be required, she also relied on the “ever-present potential for violent 
confrontation and conflagration,” which had ripened “into actual unrest and 
conflict” in that particular case.73 In later extending the malice standard to a 
non-riot situation in Hudson v. McMillian, 74  Justice O’Connor stated, 
“Whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, corrections 
officers must balance the need ‘to maintain or restore discipline’ through 
force against the risk of injury to inmates. Both situations may require 
prison officials to act quickly and decisively.”75 The difference between a 
reprobated purpose to inflict harm and a permissible purpose to maintain 
order and discipline is not always a clear one. The Court gave some leeway 
to corrections officials through scienter requirements, rather than applying 
a reasonableness standard similar to that used in Fourth Amendment 
excessive force cases—which do not involve inmates. 
Justice Breyer in Kingsley departed from the Whitley malice standard for 
pretrial detainees’ excessive force claims, in favor of an objective 
reasonableness standard like that used in Fourth Amendment cases. 76 
Pretrial detainee claims, however, are similar to convicted prisoner claims 
with respect to officials’ need to maintain order and discipline.77 Indeed, the 
facts of Kingsley suggest as much—Kingsley, a pretrial detainee, resisted 
an order to remove some paper from a light bulb in his cell, leading to a 
physical altercation when officers removed him from his cell.78  
Justice Breyer’s ground for distinguishing Whitley’s standard from the 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard was: “The 
language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the claims often 
differs. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted 
prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and 
sadistically.’”79 But as Professor Schlanger correctly points out, convicted 
prisoners and pretrial detainees generally are not distinguishable with 
respect to a no-punishment rationale; putting aside the death penalty for 
convicted prisoners, corporal punishment such as disciplinary flogging is 
 
71. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). 
72. 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986). 
73. Id. at 321 (citation omitted). 
74. 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
75. Id. at 6. 
76. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475–76 (2015). 
77. Cf. id. at 2474 (highlighting the need to maintain institutional order as relevant).  
78. Id. at 2470. 
79. Id. at 2475. 











generally forbidden as to all inmates.80 While Professor Schlanger treats this 
similarity as a reason to extend the Kingsley holding to convicted 
prisoners, 81  it might just as easily suggest that Kingsley was wrongly 
decided. In short, both with respect to the need to maintain order, as well as 
with respect to a no-punishment rationale, pretrial detainees and convicted 
prisoners are similarly situated. 
Putting aside excessive force claims, moreover, the requirement of 
subjective deliberate indifference for episodic conditions claims comports 
with generally applicable substantive due process standards. Professor 
Dolovich argues that the context of imprisonment imposes on the state 
affirmative duties to protect prisoners and that recognizing such affirmative 
duties should dispense with scienter requirements.82 No one doubts that the 
state has affirmative duties toward inmates. For example, neither private 
persons nor public officers have general duties to protect free persons from 
nonofficial violence,83 nor to assure that their serious medical needs are 
addressed.84 By contrast, corrections officials are under duties with respect 
to such harms given the sequestration of prisoners, which entails foreclosing 
other sources of help.85 
But just because corrections officials owe affirmative duties to inmates 
does not answer the question of whether scienter should be required to make 
out a violation of those duties. On the one hand, when general tort law 
imposes an affirmative duty, the duty is generally one of reasonableness.86 
But constitutional violations are distinguishable from tort law, and the 
overall direction of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as to executive 
official liability for episodic deficiencies has separated torts from 
constitutional violations by requiring more than negligence. In County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis87—a case involving a death resulting from a high-
 
80. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 431–32 (“[N]either pretrial detainees nor post-conviction 
prisoners can lawfully be subjected to any corporal punishment . . . .”). 
81. Id. at 425 (“American jail and prison officials do not distinguish between pretrial detainees 
and convicted prisoners, in either conditions-of-confinement or use-of-force policy. The Constitution is 
best read to do the same.”). 
82. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 945 (arguing that the actual knowledge standard is underinclusive, 
and that “[t]o meet the state’s carceral burden, prison officials at all levels must take affirmative steps to 
monitor, investigate, discover, and avert potential problems before those problems manifest themselves 
in prisoners’ actual suffering”). 
83. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“But nothing 
in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property 
of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”). 
84. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–18 (1980) (holding that Congress was not 
required to provide funds for medically necessary abortions to indigent women). 
85. Cf. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 915 (prisons create dangerous circumstances); Schlanger, 
supra note 1, at 418 (“Jail and prison render inmates unable to protect themselves without state 
participation . . . .”). 
86. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 343–48 (4th ed. 1971). 












speed chase—Justice Souter reasoned that constitutional violations by 
executive officials generally require more than negligence, because “our 
Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors and the 
governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying 
down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living 
together in society.”88  Accordingly, non-prisoner suits for constitutional 
liability against officers for third-party violence require—in addition to 
special factors giving rise to an affirmative duty (such as creating the 
danger)—a showing of deliberate indifference to a risk of which the officer 
was actually aware. 89  And the line of cases associated with Parratt v. 
Taylor,90 involving episodic injuries to property and bodily integrity by state 
and local officials, has required proof of something more than negligence, 
based on the idea that constitutional violations should generally cover more 
aggravated situations than ordinary tort law violations.91  
The substantive due process cases, however, may suggest that scienter 
requirements should be less important in general conditions cases. As 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis92 pointed out, scienter is more often required 
for substantive due process claims concerning random executive acts than 
it is for legislation. 93  Ongoing conditions or practices may be more 
analogous to legislation than to episodic executive actions. But the intuition 
that objective elements should be the primary concern in general conditions 
claims may be less because scienter is not required in such cases, than 
 
88. Id. at 848–49 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)); see also id. at 848 
(“In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976), . . . we explained that the Fourteenth Amendment is not a 
‘font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the 
States.’”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical malpractice does not become a 
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 
(1982), a case involving an involuntarily committed patient at a state hospital, the Court distinguished 
prisoner cases, id. at 321–22, and discussed a duty to provide reasonable safety to such patients, id. at 
319. The Court, however, also required more than negligence to establish liability as to determinations 
regarding treatment or habilitation. Id. at 323 (“[L]iability may be imposed only when the decision by 
the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment . . . as to 
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgement.”).  
89. See Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 13 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1165, 1187–88 (2005) (stating that the circuits articulate the state-of-mind 
requirements as “‘deliberate indifference,’ ‘willful disregard for the safety of the plaintiff,’ or ‘reckless’ 
action in ‘conscious disregard of [the] risk,’ that, when viewed in total, shocks the conscience”).  
90. 451 U.S 527 (1981). Inmates were plaintiffs in many of these cases. See, e.g., Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). 
91. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that prison official negligence did not 
constitute a deprivation for purposes of the Due Process Clause); Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified 
Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 674 (1998) (claiming the Court was motivated 
by federalism concerns as well as concerns about trivializing constitutional rights). 
92. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).  
93. See id. at 846 (“[C]riteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it 
is legislation or a specific act of a governmental officer that is at issue.”). 











because it may generally be implicit. 94  This is because officials will 
generally be aware of, or can be made aware of, ongoing systemic failures 
to meet basic human needs.  
IV. SYSTEMIC HARMS VERSUS INDIVIDUAL HARMS 
Scienter critics also argue that emphasis on scienter inappropriately 
treats systemic problems as individual wrongs of identifiable officials.95 Of 
course, injunctive claims challenging general conditions such as 
overcrowding raise systemic problems. And as noted above, scienter might 
be seen—not so much as irrelevant to such constitutional violations—as 
readily inferable from ongoing systemic conditions. The scienter critics, 
however, do not necessarily want to separate systemic conditions cases from 
episodic cases.96  They claim that even episodic conditions and uses of 
excessive force can be seen as systemic.97 To focus on the mental states of 
individual officers, they argue, fails to recognize that almost all harms to 
prisoners are “traceable to state-created conditions of confinement.” 98 
Individual fault, they claim, is not particularly relevant to liability 
determinations.99 Rather, liability should readily attach to any significant 
harms that occur to inmates during their confinement. Indeed, Professor 
Dolovich indicates that under her strict liability regime, it would not much 
 
94. Cf. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1991) (rejecting a distinction between short and 
long term conditions for purposes of scienter) (“The long duration of a cruel prison condition may make 
it easier to establish knowledge and hence some form of intent, but there is no logical reason why it 
should cause the requirement of intent to evaporate.”); id. at 300 (noting the petitioner’s 
acknowledgment that an accidental boiler malfunction would not provide a basis for a claim); Glidden, 
supra note 54, at 1860–61 (arguing that in injunctive actions addressing conditions, intent should be 
inferable from “persistent inaction”). In addition, prisoners sometimes join general and particular claims 
as well as damages and injunctive claims. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 296 (plaintiff sought compensatory 
and injunctive relief). 
95. See supra note 10. 
96. While Professor Dolovich at points distinguishes micro and macro conditions, she ultimately 
appears to prefer treating all serious harms as more or less systemic. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 942–43, 
945; cf. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 431 (beginning with the premise that all post-conviction conditions 
count as punishment). 
97. Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1403–04 (considering whether state-of-mind requirements might 
be appropriate in specific conditions and excessive force cases, but suggesting that one should not give 
moral weight to intentions); id. at 1399 (arguing against a focus on punitive intent, because “punishment 
is . . . a complex set of practices that involve a wide array of actors and institutions”). 
98. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 908. 
99. Id. at 893 (claiming that cruel conditions represent “not personal but institutional cruelty, 
which arises when an institution by its design and operation inflicts unnecessary and avoidable harm”); 
cf. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1864 (2015) 













matter who was named as defendant—the officer or prison administrators—
even though liability would still be imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.100 
It is certainly possible to look at even episodic events through a systemic 
lens, as these critics do. Incarceration lends itself to such a perspective, 
given the more pervasive state control in prisons and jails than in the free 
world.101 What is more, even episodic defaults of corrections officials might 
often be traced to failures of funding, staffing, training, or ethos. But if 
episodic harms to inmates can largely be attributed to an underfunded and 
understaffed system, it may be all the more appropriate to require scienter 
as a prerequisite for holding individuals liable for damages judgments.102 
Our civil rights liability system, moreover, operates under traditional rule-
of-law notions that individuals are responsible for their own wrongdoing. If 
courts are going to hold an individual liable, and particularly for damages, 
the legal system appropriately requires that the individual have the requisite 
fault for a violation.103  
Scienter critics point to widespread indemnification of officers by their 
government employers as alleviating concerns for individual defendants’ 
being held liable for damages.104 Even if one assumes pervasive indemnity, 
however, one can hardly think that being sued and held liable as an 
individual for a constitutional violation is a matter of indifference to 
defendant officials—in terms of time, reputational harm, job security, and 
 
100. Dolovich, supra note 1, at 970 (reasoning that “so long as the causation requirement is 
satisfied, it should not matter which defendants plaintiffs sue”); id. at 937–38 (claiming § 1983 liability 
is appropriate because cruelty is “manifested most immediately by the inflicting officer, who acts on 
behalf of the state and is the necessary vehicle for any state action” (footnote omitted)). See also id. at 
939 (arguing that § 1983 liability importantly focuses on the specific actions that caused harm). 
101. See, e.g., Lisa Kerr, How the Prison is a Black Box in Punishment Theory, 69 UNIV. OF 
TORONTO L.J. 85, 95 (2019) (calling prisons “total institutions” (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, Asylums: 
Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (1961))). 
102. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (stating that “good-faith immunity would 
bar liability” if budgetary constraints prevented a professional from meeting “normal professional 
standards”).  
103. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the 
Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 94–96 (1989) (arguing that both causation and fault are 
essential to a corrective justice basis for awarding damages); Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1403 (while 
criticizing scienter requirements, noting that “[o]ne could make consequentialist, expressivist, and 
character-based arguments in support of the claims that prison officials’ intentions are relevant to 
constitutional analysis”); cf. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 207, 242 (2013) (stating that damages are “ordinarily not a constitutionally required remedy for 
constitutional violations”); id. at 259, 262–63 (in the context of qualified immunity decisions, arguing 
for a standard considering whether the defendant’s actions were unreasonable in the sense that they were 
“clearly unconstitutional”). 
104. See Schlanger, supra note 1, at 435 (stating that qualified immunity and universal indemnity 
render the prospect of “unfair monetary assessments against innocent officials . . . extremely 
implausible”); cf. James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth of Personal 
Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561, 579 (2020) (concluding that 
individual Bureau of Prisons officials rarely contribute to payments of settlements and judgments); 
Dolovich, supra note 1, at 938 n.227 (favoring indemnity, given that prison problems are systemic). 











even inmate taunting. 105  For the scienter critics, however, individual 
liability may largely be a way to impose costs on the system.106 Of course, 
it is possible that more lenient standards of proof for damages that will 
ultimately be paid by the government would translate into greater funding 
for prisons and jails, leading to the more systemic reforms that the scienter 
critics aim for. Nevertheless, a better way to achieve systemic reform would 
likely lie in injunctive cases addressing systemic conditions. 107 And in such 
cases, the court’s subjective standards likely are not the main barrier to 
reform, as discussed below.  
V. THE EFFECT OF SCIENTER ON OUTCOMES 
Scienter critics also claim that the subjective standards put an almost 
impossible burden on inmate plaintiffs’ ability to succeed in constitutional 
litigation against corrections officials.108 For example, one critic stated that, 
“Whatever transpires in the nation’s prisons, the officials involved can 
nearly always claim that they did not intend for the harm to occur. The 
burden to prove otherwise is on the prisoner plaintiff, and it is a nearly 
impossible burden to meet.” 109  Another said that the Court’s scienter 
requirements have “radically undermined prison officials’ accountability 
for tragedies behind bars.” 110  Lowering the standard for liability will 
presumably allow more prisoners to prevail and improve conditions in 
prisons and jails.  
 
105. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences 
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 848 (2010) (“Lawsuits can deter in 
nonmonetary ways, of course, by educating wrongdoers, creating stigma and adverse publicity, or 
causing personal offense.”); Armacost, supra note 91, at 669 (arguing that “individual damages liability 
for constitutional violations serves a role that is analogous to the moral blaming function of criminal 
law”); Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1567–58 (2018) 
(expressing doubt about bureaucrats’ sensitivity to financial penalties, but noting that “[t]ort and habeas 
litigation . . . impose nonpecuniary costs upon defendants related to lost time and damaged reputation”); 
see also Reinert, supra, at 850 & nn.185–86 (indicating that the indemnification standard for federal 
officials is generally premised on whether indemnification “is in the interests of the United States”). 
106. See Dolovich, supra note 1, at 938 n.227. 
107. Cf. Metzger, supra note 99, at 1917–18 (indicating that Bivens actions are not a promising 
avenue for expanding supervisory liability, and that incorporating such liability “would entail a 
fundamental reorientation of Bivens actions” (citing Reinert, supra note 105, at 846–50)). 
108. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 434 (agreeing with the concurrence of Justice White in Wilson v. 
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991), that making constitutional liability turn on individual officials’ states 
of mind means “serious deprivations of basic human needs” will go unredressed).  
109. Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1404; id. at 1357 (“[T]he mental state of a particular prison official, 
can usually be presented at the time of litigation in a way that avoids constitutional offense.”); cf. David 
M. Shapiro & Charles Hogle, The Horror Chamber: Unqualified Impunity in Prison, 93 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 2021, 2039–42 (2018) (arguing that “exacting mens rea requirements” are among the factors 
that make winning prison cases difficult); id. at 2058 (“[P]ractical and qualified immunity provide jail 
officials with an ironclad defense in nearly every case.”).  












The area in which scienter requirements seem most subject to criticism 
is general conditions cases in which plaintiffs seek injunctive relief; these 
are also the cases that may have the most promise of improving conditions. 
It is not clear, however, that the deliberate indifference standard has had 
much impact on the success of such cases. To the extent scienter in general 
conditions cases imposes a burden on plaintiffs to show that higher level 
officials had knowledge of an institution’s failure to meet basic human 
needs, such proof will generally be available. Plaintiffs and their attorneys 
can themselves assure that such knowledge exists by informing officials in 
writing of ongoing problems. Indeed, Professor Schlanger herself 
characterized the scienter requirements in general conditions cases as a 
complicating factor, but “hardly insurmountable.”111  
This is not to say that those bringing conditions cases have an easy time 
of it, but this may largely be due to a number of other hurdles that the Court 
and Congress have imposed. 112  The objective requirements for general 
conditions cases are high; the Court in Rhodes v. Chapman113  required 
plaintiffs to point to specific defects affecting basic human needs.114 What 
is more, the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 115  presumptive two-year 
limitation on injunctions means that fewer prisons will remain under 
injunctive decrees, even when plaintiffs have previously succeeded in 
obtaining relief. 116  The PLRA also has limitations on attorneys’ fees, 
making inmate cases generally less attractive to lawyers.117 In summary, the 
 
111. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court 
Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 617 (2006); see also Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 
OR. L. REV. 151, 191 (2020) (claiming that in prison cases seeking injunctions, “courts tend to focus on 
whether the defendant named in his or her official capacity has the ability to correct the violation, not 
whether the named defendant has the knowledge or intent sufficient to demonstrate deliberate 
indifference”); Glidden, supra note 54, at 1817 (“When a harmful condition is ongoing, many courts 
also seem to infer intent on the part of prison defendants since the officials are willing to allow the 
conditions to persist.”). 
112. Cf. Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Sound Principles, Undesirable Outcomes: Justice 
Scalia’s Paradoxical Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 AKRON L. REV. 301, 345, 349 (2016) 
(suggesting that subjective requirements may not be the main cause of limited prisoner rights, and 
pointing to the fact that rights can be defeated by contrary interests, as in the case of allowing supermax 
prisons). 
113. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
114. See id. at 347; Schlanger, supra note 111, at 555, 602 (conditions litigation remains stronger 
than conventional wisdom assumes, although decrees have become more precise); id. at 605 (attributing 
greater precision in public law prison cases in part to the increasing sophistication of plaintiffs’ counsel); 
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1420 
(2007) (requiring more rigorous proof for public law decrees is not necessarily undesirable).  
115. 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996). 
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (2000); see Schlanger, supra note 111, at 591 (stating that this provision 
“both shrank the stock of old orders and slowed the flow of new ones”).  
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2000); see Schlanger, supra note 111, at 593–94; cf. id. at 592–93 
(also discussing problems with administrative exhaustion requirements, although indicating that 
lawyers’ involvement mitigates the problems in general conditions cases).  











knowledge requirement may not be a significant cause of the difficulties in 
pursuing general conditions cases when compared to other legal obstacles.  
Nevertheless, state-of-mind requirements pose greater hurdles for 
episodic claims, where a plaintiff will need to show evidence of scienter 
with respect to a discrete past event, rather than as to ongoing systemic 
conditions. If the standard was merely negligence (or strict liability), the 
claims would be easier to prove. But one might get the impression from 
reading the scienter critics that such cases never make it beyond summary 
judgment motions.118  
Scienter, however, often presents factual questions that preclude 
summary judgment.119  In Eighth Amendment excessive force cases, for 
example, presenting sufficient evidence of malice to avoid summary 
judgment is by no means impossible. Plaintiffs are allowed to use 
circumstantial evidence to prove malice inferentially, such as by showings 
of repeated tasing 120  or continued immobilization of an inmate for an 
extended period after the threat has ceased.121  Courts have also treated 
evidence that officers perceive a prisoner as recalcitrant or annoying as 
evidence of malice.122  
What is more, scienter requirements may lower qualified immunity 
hurdles. Overcoming qualified immunity ordinarily requires that the 
defendant’s acts were not just unconstitutional, but clearly unconstitutional 
at the time the defendant acted—usually shown by closely analogous 
decisional law at the time the officer acted.123  Professor Armacost has 
 
118. See Ristroph, supra note 1, at 1382 (“It is almost always judges rather than jurors who make 
factual findings about what prison officials intended.”); id. at 1380 n.120 (claiming judges in qualified 
immunity determinations “end up effectively deciding the factual questions, including those concerning 
the official’s intentions”). But cf. Reinert, supra note 105, at 843 (finding qualified immunity defenses 
were the basis of dismissal in only 5 of the 244 Bivens cases he studied); id. at 844 (suggesting the 
possibility that a majority of Bivens cases involved well-established law for which qualified immunity 
defenses might not be available). 
119. See, e.g., Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2015) (reversing summary judgment for the 
defendants, because there were material issues of fact in dispute as to the deliberate indifference of 
nurses who adopted a wait-and-see attitude that delayed treatment for plaintiff’s broken jaw for 
seventeen hours); id. at 80 (noting the factual dispute as to whether the defendants subjectively knew 
that plaintiff’s jaw was broken). 
120. Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 107, 114–16 (4th Cir. 2019) (reversing summary judgment 
because a reasonable jury could conclude that repeated tasing after a prisoner failed to cooperate in 
securing a photograph was wanton infliction of pain).  
121. Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 2015) (reversing grant of summary judgment to 
defendants where a prisoner was immobilized in a restraint chair for an extended period of time). 
122. See, e.g., Brooks, 924 F.3d at 115 (officers’ noting in the incident report that the plaintiff was 
disrespectful and threatened to sue officers could be indicative of malice). Courts may also treat the 
malice requirement as impliedly lowering the injury severity an inmate needs to show in Eighth 
Amendment excessive force cases. Cf. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 9–10 (1992) (holding that a 
lack of serious injury resulting from the plaintiff’s being struck while handcuffed did not preclude an 
Eighth Amendment claim). 
123. See Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure, 117 MICH. 












observed, however, that “qualified immunity often drops out of the analysis 
when the underlying claim requires a showing of bad intent.” 124  She 
concludes that for many claims requiring a showing of deliberate 
indifference where there seemingly is such intent, including inmate claims 
concerning medical needs, “the courts have found it unnecessary to ask 
whether officials had notice that their conduct would likely violate the 
Constitution or to scour precedent for closely analogous cases.”125 This has 
also been true in many prisoner excessive force cases,126 where the need to 
show closely analogous cases is often lightened.127  
Despite the scienter requirements, federal courts still see large numbers 
of inmate cases,128 and Professor Reinert has presented evidence that they 
have a higher rate of success than many assumed they would. Reinert looked 
 
124. Armacost, supra note 91, at 591; Struve, supra note 7, at 1074–75 (finding that “[a]t least 
some courts have held that, when the Eighth Amendment excessive force test applies, there is no room 
for qualified immunity,” and thus suggesting that an objective standard for pretrial detainee claims would 
not be discontinuous with Eighth Amendment standards). 
125. Armacost, supra note 91, at 641–43 (and citing cases). But cf. id. at 644–45 (noting cases 
where conduct did not carry its own indicia of fault such that “analogous precedent [was] necessary to 
ensure that only culpable officials are exposed to liability,” such as cases involving inmates’ refusing 
antipsychotic drugs). 
126. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 878 F.3d 89, 106 (4th Cir. 2017) (“For claims where intent is 
an element, an official’s state of mind is a reference point by which she can reasonably assess conformity 
to the law because the case law is intent-specific.”); Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 
2002) (“In this Circuit, a defense of qualified immunity is not available in cases alleging excessive force 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because the use of force ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause 
harm’ is clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution . . . .”). But cf. Henry v. Dinelle, 929 F. 
Supp. 2d 107, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (indicating a jury finding of malicious use of force was not 
irreconcilably inconsistent with a jury finding that the force was objectively reasonable, which entitled 
the officers to qualified immunity).  
127. Thompson, 878 F.3d at 103 (although there were not many cases addressing rough rides, 
“there [was] a clear consensus among the circuits . . . that infliction of pain and suffering without 
penological justification violates the Eighth Amendment in an array of contexts”); Brooks, 924 F.3d at 
119 (indicating the use of force in bad faith was clearly established as an Eighth Amendment violation); 
cf. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013) (determining that reference to analogous 
cases involving the allegedly excessive use of pepper spray was not required); Perez v. Cox, 788 F. 
App’x 438 (9th Cir. 2019) (denying qualified immunity despite a prior Ninth Circuit decision approving 
the use of birdshot to control inmates). But cf. McCoy v. Alamu, 950 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding 
that an isolated single use of pepper spray did not clearly cross over the de minimis line and therefore 
that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity); id. at 235–36 (Costa, J., dissenting) (arguing that an 
unprovoked use of force violates clearly established law).  
128. The statistics for the year ending September 30, 2019, show 19,350 prisoner “civil rights” 
filings and an additional 10,095 filings for “prison conditions.” See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, TABLE C-2. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS––CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
AND NATURE OF SUIT (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c2_0930.2019 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ATM-3HH4]. This represents approximately 10% of the total 297,877 suits 
commenced in the district courts. Id.; see also Reinert, supra note 6, at 818–19 n.1 (referring to 
comparable statistics for 2013). Civil rights suits would include some types of cases not discussed in 
this Essay, such as procedural due process cases. See supra note 2. The legislative history of the PLRA 
reveals past concerns about inmates’ filing too many meritless suits. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-667, 
at 21–23 (1995) (House Judiciary Committee Report on the related bill: Violent Criminal Incarceration 
Act of 1995). 











at success rates for Bivens claims129—constitutional claims for damages 
against federal officers—in five federal districts during the period from 
2001 to 2003.130 The cases included a large number of prison conditions 
damages claims, particularly in two of the districts.131 After excluding cases 
that district courts dismissed sua sponte for frivolousness, the success rate 
for prisoner suits was 26.1%.132 Previous estimates for § 1983 prisoner-case 
success by Professor Schlanger and Professors Schwab and Eisenberg 
ranged from 15 to 18%,133 which Reinert opined would have been higher 
had the sua sponte dismissals been excluded.134 In addition, Schwab and 
Eisenberg indicated that in counsel-filed cases, prisoners succeeded in 53% 
of cases, which was comparable to success rates of 56% for non-prisoner 
constitutional tort claimants.135  
It may be that the prisoner damages claims succeed primarily in 
aggravated cases. But as Professors Jeffries and Rutherglen have stated, 
“Money damages are most likely to prove effective against extreme or 
egregious constitutional violations” under current doctrine, which perhaps 
“should be true.”136  They cite to the desirability of a fault standard, to 
concerns about overdeterrence, and to possible inhibition of constitutional 
change.137 In a similar vein, Professor Armacost has observed that “limiting 
constitutional damages liability to cases involving truly blameworthy 
conduct may best preserve the moral force of such liability.”138 
 
129. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971), the Court recognized an implied right of action under the Fourth Amendment against federal law 
enforcement officers. Such implied constitutional actions are used for Eighth Amendment and Fifth 
Amendment inmate claims against federal officers. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) 
(allowing an implied damages action under the Eighth Amendment for an alleged failure to address 
serious medical needs). 
130. Reinert, supra note 105, at 832.  
131. Id. at 836.  
132. Id. at 841 n.154. 
133. Id. at 829 (citing Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2003); 
Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of 
the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 732–33 (1988)). 
134. Reinert, supra note 105, at 842–43.  
135. Id. at 830 & n.109 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of 
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987), which analyzed data from the Central 
District of California). 
136. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 114, at 1405.  
137. Id. at 1403–04; cf. id. at 1404–05 (recommending that damages remedies be tailored to 
specific rights violated). 
138. Armacost, supra note 91, at 680; id. at 679 (“The notion that section 1983 liability entails 
some level of moral stigma also suggests an argument against the conventional view that more 













The scienter critics argue that the Court has based its state-of-mind 
requirements on a mistaken notion that, for an action to constitute 
punishment, it must necessarily involve a purpose to chastise or deter. 
Intentions to chastise and deter, however, remain central to the concept of 
punishment, and reference to other purposes of punishment does not suggest 
dispensing with a culpable state-of-mind requirement in inmate suits against 
corrections officials. Scienter requirements, moreover, may be justified 
apart from notions of punishment—by the need to maintain order in prisons 
and to distinguish constitutional violations from ordinary torts. State-of-
mind requirements, moreover, do not pose the impenetrable barrier to 
liability that critics claim. This is particularly true in systemic conditions 
cases—the cases that have the most promise of improving the lives of 
inmates. 
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